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RES JUDICATA-WILL IT STOP INSTREAM FLOWS
FROM BEING THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE?
HAROLD A. RANQUIST*

I. INTRODUCTION
The adjudication of relative rights to the use of water in the West
under the appropriation doctrine has had a stormy history. Originating in the conflict between miners and farmers struggling over the
use of a limited water supply,' the doctrine and a limited supply of
water have spawned litigation between individuals, among the states
of the union, and between the states and the United States government. More of the same is threatened. One of the great battles bred
by the doctrine has grown out of a reluctance of the states to recognize the role of the federal sovereign in protecting a portion of that
limited water supply for its own use in accomplishing its purposes2
under the "implied-reservation of water doctrine." 3 That battle still
rages. 4
This article identifies another question that is presenting a hesitant
toe on the stage of water rights litigation. This is the issue of instream flows.' Until recent years, the western states have denied that
instream flows-that misbegotten child of the hated riparian doctrine-had any place in the appropriation system. 6 As the move to
*Attorney, Department of the Interior Field Solicitor's Office, Albuquerque, New
Mexico. This article is an expression of the author's personal opinions and does not
represent the opinions, policies or positions of the Department of the Interior or its
officials.
1. A newspaper reporter aptly stated that "every time a drop of water falls, they examine
it, name it, dam it and fight over it." Resnick, Light at the End of the Water Pipe, Arizona
Daily Star (Tucson), Sept. 2, 1973, § H, col. 1.
2. See NAT'L WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 458-83
(1973); 1 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 7, STUDY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER ON PUBLIC LANDS 47-145
(1968).
3. This is the term used by Justice Rehnquist in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696, 700 (1978).
4. Widman & Clark, Comments on California v. United States and United States v. New
Mexico, 11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUNDATION WATER LAW NEWSLETTER 1
(1978).
5. "Instream flow" is defined as the flow of water in its natural channels without
diversion. ."Instream use" is defined as the use of water in its natural channels without
diversion.
6. The appropriation doctrine as it was developed in each of the western states required
the diversion of water from the natural stream as one of the requirements that must be met
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establish instream flows increases, fueled by concern over the environment of man, fish, wildlife, plants, and animals in the watersheds of
the West, present users of water are rising in opposition, and preparations are being made for the coming conflict.'
One of the barriers which the opponents of instream flows will
erect is the claim that the streams of the West are fully appropriated
and that many are adjudicated; therefore, there is little or no room
for the exercise of instream flows.
They will argue that the sacred nature of their adjudicated rights
and the protection provided by the bar to further litigation under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are a shield against
instream water claims.
This article stems from the author's experience in preparing some
of the issues presented in the case of United States v. Truckee Carson
Irrigation District (the Pyramid Lake case), which is pending now
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.8 The case involves
the claim of the Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe to certain flows of the
Truckee River in the state of Nevada for the purposes of maintaining
the level of a large desert lake within their reservation, and sustaining
fish spawning runs in the river. The other major water users along the
stream in Nevada defended against the claim of the tribe, and of the
United States in the tribe' behalf, by asserting that the claim was
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the United
States had participated in an earlier stipulated decree in an adjudication of the waters of the Truckee River. 9 There the United States
had asserted water rights for a large reclamation project and for the
irrigation of land on the Indian reservation, but no claim had been
made to a water right for the lake or for a fishery in the lake and the
river. Historically, that fishery had been the major natural resource
of the tribe.
This article discusses the application of the bar against further
in the acquisition of a water right. Under the concept of that doctrine the instream use of
water for many years was not considered a beneficial use which could be acquired and
protected against those having the right to divert the water pursuant to the provisions of
state law. See R. DEWSNUP, LEGAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM WATER VALUES 10
(1971) (Legal Study 8-A for the National Water Commission). Instream flows are discussed
further in Part V.
7. R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, STRATEGIES FOR RESERVING FLOWS FOR FISH
AND WILDLIFE: IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION, AND PRELIMINARY EVALUATION (1977) (Western Energy & Land Use Team, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Dep't of
Interior).
8. Civ. No. R-2987-JBA (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1115 and
78-1493 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1978 and Mar. 7, 1978, respectively) [hereinafter cited as
Pyramid Lake case].
9. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity A-3 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 1944).
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action to water rights litigation under the appropriation doctrine.
The unique nature of water and of the water adjudication process,
particularly quiet title proceedings, results in many water uses not
being subject to the bar against further litigation. Some uses not
barred are discussed, among them instrearn flows.
This article will examine why instream flows can be viewed as an
issue open to subsequent litigation, even though such flows could
have been asserted in a prior proceeding. The reasons why instream
flows can in some cases be exercised without devastating impacts on
existing diversion rights from some streams also will be discussed.
The ultimate conclusion is that, if diversion from streams of the West
is restricted to effective beneficial use, water will be available. to
establish instream flows in some areas of some streams in spite of the
argued applicability of the bar to further action. Legislative action
will be required, however, to protect those instream flows from
diversion by other appropriators. A challenge is issued to the states
to eliminate waste and ineffective use and then to enact legislation
which will make the establishment and protection of instream flows
possible. 1 0
II. ADJUDICATION OF WATER RIGHTS UNDER THE APPROPRIATION
DOCTRINE IN QUIET TITLE ACTIONS AS A UNIQUE
LEGAL PROCEDURE
The adjudication of water rights in western states using the appropriation doctrine is a legal procedure with unique characteristics. It
differs in significant ways from most other types of legal proceedings. One renowned author defined that adjudication procedure as
follows:
The determination of [water] rights is a far different matter than
the adjudication of relative rights between two or even dozens of
contestants-not only in degree and amount, as obviously it is, but
also in kind and specie. Only in the sense that any determination
which necessarily results in a favoring of one party over another can
be said to involve the exercise of a judicial capacity is this determination judicial. But in its essence it is not a judicial function at all; the
problem is the ascertainment of the quantity of water in a drainage
system, the finding of the dates and amounts of appropriations of all
users, the careful arrangement of the data found in tabular order, all
10. The need to protect the environment of water courses for fishery and wildlife values
to some reasonable extent was recognized by President Carter in his water policy statement.
Water Policy Initiatives, H.R. DOC. NO. 95-347, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprintedin [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1793.
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as preliminary to the distribution of water ...to those entitled.
Actual controversy over the use of the water is not essential, nor are
adversary interests as we normally employ that term. To seek an
analogy, the determination is akin to a census taking or, better, the
preparation
of a list of those qualified to exercise the voting priv1
ilege. 1

A Texas jurist also recognized water rights adjudications as a unique
kind of case when he began an opinion with the lament that the case
presented "procedural problems of stream litigation occasioned by
the absence of rules and statutes suited to this special class of
case."

1

2

There are three different kinds of proceedings used to adjudicate
the relative rights to the use of water among those having a right to
divert water from a stream. These adjudication procedures were
described by Edward W. Clyde as follows:
1. Administrative proceedings, as in Wyoming, with the right of
review in the appellate court on question of law;
2. General statutory adjudications, which vary greatly from State to
State; and
3. Actions in the nature of quiet title suits ...1 3

Numerous authors agree that quiet title proceedings1 ' in water adjudication suits have special problems, including the applicability of
the bar to further action.' I These suits differ from other types of
litigation in the number and types of issues that are decided or might
have been decided in a water adjudication and yet may not be
subject to the bar to further action. The differences arise because of
the nature of water, including the timing and the way in which water
11. Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the StateVia Irrigation Administration (pt. 1), 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 161, 188 (1929) [hereinafter cited as LaskyI.
12. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of Laredo, 346
S.W.2d 886,887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (J. Pope).
13. 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 530, at 507 (1972).
14. Many states have a provision for statutory proceedings but do not use it regularly. As
an example, Nevada has a statutory proceeding, NEV. REV. STAT. §533.090 (Repl. 1973),
which permits an administrative determination of the relative rights of claimants to water of
a stream or stream system. That procedure provides for an appeal through the state courts.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § §533.160-.210 (Repl. 1973). However, most proceedings are filed
as quiet title actions to adjudicate the relative rights of various claimants to divert water for
various specified uses. This is the usual procedure under Nevada water law. Problems similar
to those occurring in quiet title actions may arise in applying the bar to further action to
statutory proceedings authorized by most western states. This article does not address those
types of proceedings.
15. Lasky, supra note 11, at 189-90; see also Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams
in Montana, 19 MONT. L. REV. 19 (1957).

RESJUDICATA

January 19801

becomes available for man's use in streams and groundwater basins.
It comes in flood flows and summer trickles, wet years and dry years,
and sometimes not at all during periods of drought. It comes from
different sources, both ground and surface, at greatly different
speeds and at different times of year. The use of return flows and the
rules against waste, etc., all complicate the decision on how to provide for the maximum use of this vital resource and still provide a
measure of certainty to the water user.
Differences also occur as a result of the nature of quiet title proceedings adjudicating relative rights to the use of water. Except in
limited cases, such as the small watershed completely within one
state, the quiet title form of stream adjudication cannot adjudicate
all of the subject matter-i.e., relative rights and priorities to the use
of water-among all of the claimants from the headwaters of the
stream to the sea. All these considerations-plus the vast numbers of
necessary parties to the proceedings, the lack of information concerning the hydrologic relationship between the surface and the
groundwater in the particular area under consideration, the absence
of the court's jurisdiction over water in another state, and the limitation of the appropriation doctrine to waters diverted from the stream
as differentiated from instream water uses-have caused some writers
to call quiet title actions inadequate1 6 and to describe their results as

"ludicrous."

1

Quiet title proceedings vary from state to state depending upon
the various provisions of state law. The use of this type of proceeding
has been widespread, however,' 8 and much information can be
gained from the various state courts as to what issues the adjudications do or do not decide and how the bar to further action has been
applied to those issues which might have been decided but were not.
This article will look at the kinds of issues that might have been but
were not decided in various quiet title proceedings concerning water
rights and will examine whether the bar to further action should be
applied to the later litigation of such issues. As part of this effort, the
author will discuss whether claims for instream uses of waters in
rivers such as the Truckee River are barred because they might have
been adjudicated in a prior proceeding. The decisions of the various

16. Id.
17. Lasky, supra note 11, at 190.
18. See, e.g., Pacific Yacht Club v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 98 Cal. 487, 33 P. 322
(1893); Taylor v. Hulett, 15 Idaho 265, 97 P. 37 (1908); Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19
P. 571 (1888); Logan, Hyde Parks & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 269
P. 776 (1928).
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state courts will be cited with some emphasis on the state of
Nevada.' 9
III. RES JUDICATA IN WATER RIGHTS LITIGATION
The doctrine of res judicata has two parts. The first, which applies
to repetitious suits involving the same cause of action, is based upon
considerations of judicial economy and the need for certainty in legal
relations.2" This is the general rule of res judicata, which provides

that:
[W] hen a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and
their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose." 21
Thus, any subsequent litigation on the same cause of action may be
barred.
But where the parties subsequently litigate a different cause or
demand,
[T] he judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to
matters which might have been litigated and determined, but "only
as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." . . .[T] he
parties are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the first
proceeding, even though such points might have been tendered and
decided at that time. But matters which were actually litigated and
determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated .... In
this sense, res judicata is usually and more accurately
referred to as
22
estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel.
This principle has been restated recently by the United States
Supreme Court.2 3
In water adjudications using quiet title proceedings, the courts
have adopted a narrow construction of the bar to further proceed19. The author uses the state of Nevada, the adjudication of the Truckee River in the
quiet title proceeding United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity A-3 (D. Nev. Sept. 8,
1944) and the attack made on that decree in the case of United States v. Truckee Carson
Irrigation Dist., supra note 8, as an example because the issues of that case are, in his
opinion, illustrative of the situation on other streams in other areas. Reference to testimony
and exhibits herein refers to the testimony and exhibits in that case.
20. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
21. Id., quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
22. Id. at 598, quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. at 353.
23. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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ings. The root of this view, after adoption of the appropriation doctrine by western states, occurs in Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg.24 There the court said:

The decrees in the former suits, being final and unreversed, are res
judicata of the subject-matter of the suits as then decided, between
the parties thereto and their successors in interest. This is true
whether the courts based their opinions and decrees upon a correct
or an erroneous view, either of the law or of the facts. They are not

conclusive as to matters which might have been decided therein, but
only as to such matters as were in fact decided, within the issues
raised by the pleadings.2"
It is pertinent to recognize that there were times when the courts
used the injunctive language of a prior decree to deny a litigant the
opportunity for a second suit on some separate issue that might have
been litigated in the prior proceeding. An example is the Montana
case of Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms Co.2 6 The court held:
The doctrine of res adjudicata applies to water cases. The final decree of 1892 is binding and conclusive between all the parties to the
suit and their privies and successors in interest, as to all matters
adjudicated therein and as to all issues which could have been properly raised irrespective of whether the particular matter was in fact
litigated.2
However, Justice Morris in that case dissented in part and was
joined by two other justices on the point concerning what could have
been litigated. According to the dissenters, the majority opinion
went "beyond the better reasoned rule and the one generally accepted. . . . It is only' issues properly brought within the pleadings in

the particular case and determined by the decree that are res adjudicata in a subsequent action between the same parties. ' ' 2 8 It is important to note that with the joinder of the two dissenting justices, Justice Morris' position on this question becomes the majority position
of that case. 9
24. 81 F. 73 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
25. Id.at 116.
26. 116 Mont. 152, 151 P.2d 483 (1944).
27. Id.at
,151 P.2d at 484.
28. Id. at __, 151 P.2d at 493.
29. Professor Albert W. Stone called the Kramer case "an aberration, an example of
treating an adjudication as broad, firm and conclusive, and an exception to the usual narrowness and inconclusiveness of a decree." He then goes on to describe the usual pattern which
in effect rejects barring those things which might have been litigated. Stone, Montana Water
Rights-A New Opportunity, 34 MONT. L. REV. 57, 65 (1973).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

Perhaps the most careful refinement in distinguishing those issues
that might have been litigated in water adjudication suits that are
subject to the bar against further litigation from those that are not
appears in Bijou Irrigation District v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co."3 In
that case, the plaintiffs filed an action against the defendant irrigation district alleging the abandonment of part of the water right.
Judgment was given for the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed.
The defendant claimed that by the introduction of extrinsic evidence
it could prove that the court, in a previous decree, had passed on the
facts or issues upon which the plaintiff had based its case. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant had been
entitled to a hearing on the particular issue. In reaching its decision,
the court stated:
It is well settled that questions litigated in one action may not be
again litigated by the same parties in another action, and whether or
not they were litigated in the first action may be shown by extrinsic
evidence, under proper allegations in the plea, if such fact does not
appear from the record. There is a recognized difference between the
effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim or demand and its effect as an
estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different
claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment is a bar,
not only as to matters offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to other admissible matters which might
have been offered for that purpose. Where there is a second action
between the same parties, but upon a different demand, the estoppel
operates only as to those matters in issue or points controverted
upon the determination of which a finding or verdict was rendered. 3 1
Thus the court had to determine whether the later suit was based on
a "different claim or cause of action." In making its determination,
the court posed the issue as "whether or not in the diversion suit the
same facts, relied upon here to show abandonment, were controverted, and examined and passed upon by the court." 3 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Masterson v. Pacific
Live Stock Co.3 3 explained that in order for a judgment to be a bar
against further action, "it must appear either upon the face of the
record or by extrinsic evidence that the same matter was in issue and
determined in the previous action. It is not enough that the matter
30.
31.
32.
33.

67 Colo. 336, 184 P. 382 (1919).
Id. at -,
184 P. at 385.
Id.
144 Or. 396, 24 P.2d 1046 (1933).
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was in issue, but it must clearly appear to have been adjudicated." ' I
To determine what was adjudicated in order to apply the bar to
further litigation, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated: "The best
and most accurate test ...is whether the same evidence would sustain both [judgments], and if it would the two actions are the same,
and this is true, although the two actions are different in form."" s
That same court, in the case of Henderlider v. Canon Heights Irrigation & Reservoir Co.,3 6 pithily commented:
A decree is not woven of thin air; it is a determination of a specific
issue presented to the court. It is grounded on the facts creating that
issue; and, where construction is necessary, it must be construed in
the light of the facts which gave it birth and limited by the issue it
resolved. 3 '
This principle has a significant impact when applied to instream
flows.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE BAR TO FURTHER LITIGATION
A better understanding of the limitations placed by courts on the
bar to further litigation in water cases may be obtained from a discussion of some of the specific issues which the courts have held
were not subject to the bar. Then the issue of instream flows will be
added to the list and compared to see if it is entitled to the same
treatment.
There are many issues that might have been adjudicated in a given
proceeding which the courts have held were not barred from further
litigation. The following discussion covers some of them.
Inchoate or Conditional Water Rights
In many decrees there are some rights which have not yet been
perfected; the water user is in the process of putting the water to
beneficial use but has not completed the project. Nevertheless, the
court recognizes the right and includes it in the ladder of priorities.
The measure of the right is usually stated in very general terms.
Moses Lasky, in a discussion of conditional decrees and adjudication of water claims which had been initiated but not completed,
stated:
34. Id. at __
, 24 P.2d at 1049.
35. Pomponio v. Larsen, 80 Colo. 318, 320, 251 P. 534, 536 (1926); see also City of
Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 4, 445 P.2d 52, 55 (1968).
36. 117 Colo. 183, 185 P.2d 325 (1947).
37. Id.at
, 185 P.2d at 327.
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Frequently, when at the time of adjudication claims had been initiated but not completed nor the greatest amount of water to be
used yet applied to beneficial use, the court gave a conditional decree; i.e., fixed the date of the priority and the maximum amount of
water allowed to the claimant, the actual amount to become absolute being conditioned on beneficial3 8application with due diligence
in a reasonable time, if ever or if any.

When such conditional decrees occur a collateral attack may be
brought by anyone in an independent action or suit in equity at any
time for the purpose of defining the limits
of the water right vis-a-vis
3
the other water rights in the watershed .
A conditional provision in a decree may permit the diversion of
water for the purpose of developing lands not yet irrigated. In discussing whether or not such a provision can act as a bar untler the
doctrine of res judicata, the Supreme Court of Oregon held: "Rights
not complete at the time the decree is rendered, the work being still

in progress, are left open by the decree. The decree is not res judicata
as to them." 4 0 In an early case, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that any right obtained under the conditional
provisions of a decree
4
constitutes an inchoate right or interest. 1
As an example, the Orr Ditch Decree entered in the adjudication
of the Truckee River 4 2 allocated 232,800 acre-feet of water to the
Newlands Project, a federal reclamation project. That project had
irrigated up to 72,000 acres over a 70-year period but has never
served more than about 63,000 acres in one year. The realities of the
38. Lasky, supra note 11, at 196.
39. Crawford Clipper Ditch Co. v. Needle Rock Ditch Co., 50 Colo. 176, 114 P. 655
(1911); Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 109 P. 748 (1910); Conley v. Dyer, 43 Colo. 22, 95 P.
304 (1908).
40. Masterson v. Pacific Live Stock Co., 144 Or. 396, 399, 24 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1933).
41. In Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 137, 109 P. 748, 751 (1910), the court said:
When the decree was entered, defendants had a ditch with a carrying capacity
of 3.2 cubic feet of water per second of time; ... they had land which, if
irrigated, would require that amount of water, but had brought under irrigation not to exceed 80 acres, and had, therefore, applied to beneficial use not
over 1.6 cubic feet of water per second. Under these circumstances, the court
was without authority to decree an absolute right to a greater amount than
was then actually applied to beneficial use. An absolute decree for more
would, at least, be voidable, if attacked in appropriate proceedings brought
within proper time.
Nevada has embraced the same principle. See Prosole v. Streamboat Canal Co., 37 Nev. 154,
158, 140 P. 720, 724 (1914) (holding in effect that where a canal company diverted water
for distribution among farmers, the appropriation was not complete until the application of
the water to the land had occurred). Concerning this subject, see also 3 KINNEY ON
IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1577, at 2811 (2d ed. 1912); 2 S.WIEL, WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 1233, at 1137-38 (3d ed. 1911).
42. United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., In Equity A-3 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 1944).
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physical situation make it clear that the project cannot ever serve the
232,800 acres mentioned in the decree. Thus, those conditional provisions of the decree cannot be used as a basis for asserting the bar
against further litigation.
Another issue related to inchoate water rights that remained undecided by the Orr Ditch Decree was the number of acres in the
project which had established water rights by applying the water to
beneficial use within a reasonable time after inception of the project.
Those areas actually irrigated would appear to be covered by the
doctrine of relation back. 4" The claimed date of priority of the
project was 1902.
What constitutes a reasonable time within which water must be
applied to beneficial use is different in each case. 4 4 However,
whether the doctrine of "relation back" is applicable to the water
rights of reclamation projects and how the water for the project is
affected by delay in applying the water to beneficial use for a period
longer than 40 or 50 years are matters upon which the author ventures no opinion at this time. Nevertheless, that matter certainly
should not be closed by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
Demonstrably Excessive Claims to Water by Some Parties in a Decree
Closely akin to the claims for water made in a conditional decree
is the attempt of some, when faced with an adjudication proceeding,
to assert a right to use the maximum amount of water possible under
all circumstances. They trust to luck to be able to prove beneficial
use of the water if ever challenged. This opportunity in water adjudications leads to excessive water claims. 4 I When those claims are
incorporated into a decree, the benefit of the bar against further
proceedings is greatly weakened and sometimes lost.
43. NEVADA STATE ENGINEER & DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, NEVADA LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS 15 (1955) states:
The principle of relation back was established early in the judicial history of
water rights in Nevada. If the work of construction facilities, diverting and
using water, is prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the date or priority of the
right relates back to the time when the first step was taken to obtain the right.
Ophir Silver Mining Company v. Carpenter,4 Nev. 534, 543-544 (1869). If,
however, the work is not prosecuted with reasonable diligence, then the priority of the work does not relate back, but generally dates from the time when
the work is completed or the appropriation fully perfected.
44. Rodgers v. Pitt, 129 F. 932, 941-42 (C.C.D. Nev. 1904).
45. Lasky quotes numerous comments by authors of the time condemning the practice
of making excessive claims to the use of water in water suits and deploring the litigation it
engendered. Lasky concluded, "instead of a cesser of litigation, we find an enormous increase." Lasky, supra note 11, at 196-97.
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An example of an excessive claim is contained in the Orr Ditch
Decree. The enormity of the Newlands Project's claim of a water
right to irrigate 232,800 acres of land with 1500 cubic feet per
second of water is highlighted by comparing the language of the
decree where it describes the water right for the irrigation of lands on
the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation with the language describing
the water right for the Newlands Project. The Orr Ditch Decree in
Claims No. I and 2 very carefully establishes each element that can
limit a water right for the irrigation of Indian lands, but when it
describes the water right of the Newlands Project in Claim No. 3, the
right to use water is stated in the broadest possible terms, and excessive amounts of water are claimed for the irrigation of vast amounts
of land which are not susceptible to productive irrigation. The bar
against further litigation should not be used to prevent correction of
these situations. 4 6
The harm from this situation arises when a water user is permitted
to divert water based upon the capacity of his ditch and not upon the
effective, reasonable water requirements of the land actually served.
The broad general language of decrees like Claim No. 3 in the Orr
Ditch Decree does not furnish the tools for effective administration
and should be subject to challenge for that reason alone.
Many court decrees which contain the conditional water rights are
stipulated decrees entered by the court after agreement is reached
between the parties. 4 Courts should be careful in applying the bar
of res judicata or collateral estoppel to the provisions of stipulated
decrees. Frequently, the political and economic power of the parties
in the negotiations may not be equal, and the resulting stipulation
may reflect a bias which favors the economically or politically more
powerful party. Equity requires that the bar to further proceedings
not be used to perpetuate the bias. 4 8
A Decreed Right for the Irrigationof Lands That Identifies Two
Sources of Water but Does Not Determine How Much Water Is
To Be Divertedfrom Each Source
Water for the Newlands Project is obtained from both the Carson
and Truckee Rivers. The Carson River empties directly into Lahon46. New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 237, 40 P. 989 (1895).
47. The Sept. 8, 1944 Orr Ditch Decree was stipulated, following the adoption of the
1935 Truckee River Agreement by the Department of the Interior and the major water users
on the river.
48. The bar to further litigation is an equitable doctrine which should not be applied if
an inequitable result would occur. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d
199, 230, 537 P.2d 1250, 1273, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 24 (1975).
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tan Reservoir and the waters of the Truckee River are transported
over the divide from the Truckee River watershed by the Truckee
Canal to that same reservoir. These waters are used to irrigate the
lands of the North and South Carson divisions of that project.
The decree on the Carson River watershed is a temporary restraining order dated June 9, 1949. It was issued in United States v. Alpine
Land and Reservoir Company, et al.49 That decree provides for irrigation of all the lands in those two divisions from the Carson River.
The Orr Ditch Decree assumes that all lands will be irrigated with
Truckee River water. It sets a different duty of water from that set in
the Carson River Decree.
There is nothing in either decree which identifies how much water
is to be taken from either source or how many acres of land are to be
irrigated with the water from each river. The Truckee-Carson Irrigation District is attempting to irrigate approximately 60,000 acres
from the waters of both rivers which are stored in that reservoir.
Surely there is no bar to the determination of such an unresolved
issue in connection with determining the amount of water that can
legally be diverted from the Truckee River. That legal proposition
should be particularly true in view of the Nevada statutes 5which
prohibit the diversion of excess water from streams in the state. 0
Under similar circumstances the state of Oregon, the supreme
court of that state held that the bar to further action did not apply.'
In that case the decree had given waters from two creeks to
irrigate a single block of land without deciding how much water
could be taken from each creek or how much of the land was to be
irrigated from each source. The court said:
We take the decree in the adjudication pleaded as a verity as far as it
goes. That leaves the question of how much water should be taken
from Cottonwood creek [sic] and how much from Otis creek [sic]
under the award to the Pacific Live Stock Company, with the priority of 1884, 165 acres, still to be determined. 5 2
The court held that the decree was a bar to further action only on
those matters that it actually decided, such as date of priority, and
not as to matters that might have been decided, such as the amount
of water to be diverted from each source.
49. In Equity No. D-183 (D. Nev. 1949).
50. See NEV. REV. STAT. § §533.045, .060 (Repl. 1973).
51. Masterson v. Pacific Live Stock Co., 144 Or. 396, 399, 24 P.2d 1046, 1049-50

(1933).
52. Id. at

-,

24 P.2d at 1049.
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Use of Water Before and After the Irrigation Season
Ordinarily a decree permitting the diversion of water for the irrigation of agricultural land does not prevent the appropriation and use
of the water in the stream before and after the irrigation season
through the balance of the year.5 I Hence, those water uses that
occur outside of the irrigation season, such as instream flows used for
the preservation of a fishery, have an excellent opportunity to establish a right during that period which will not interfere seriously with
decreed rights. However, some decrees do not limit the water right to
the natural irrigation season in the area.5 * In those cases, an attack
under the beneficial use requirements of the decree in order to prevent the waste of water should have a reasonable degree of success.
Insofar as the Orr Ditch Decree is concerned, the right of those
parties diverting water from the Truckee River is limited to that
amount required to meet their reasonable and economical requirements for beneficial use. The decree provides:
Except as herein specially provided no diversion of water into any
ditch or canal, in this decree mentioned shall be permitted except in
such amount as shall be actually, reasonably necessary for the economical and beneficial use for which the right of diversion is determined and established by this decree. The amounts of water hereinbefore allowed are declared to be sufficient for the uses herein
mentioned, and any and all use of water in excess of such decreed
amounts is declared to be wasteful, and all wasteful or excessive use
of water is hereby prohibited.5 '
While this provision appears to leave some latitude on the subject
of non-irrigation season diversion, Nevada statutes do not. The
Nevada statutes which govern the appropriation of water provide
that the balance of the water in a stream above the reasonable and

economical requirements of existing rights shall not be considered as
having been appropriated by the holder of such rights, but that the
water shall be left in the stream.' 6 The Supreme Court of Nevada
53. Hudson v. West, 47 Cal.2d 823, 306 P.2d 807 (1957); Trinchera Irr. Dist. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 106 Colo. 128, 102 P.2d 909 (1940).
54. The natural irrigation season is defined as that period during which the crops are
growing and in need of water to sustain that growth. It is ordinarily identified in the reports
of the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture for each area as the
period of recommended irrigation. The practice of some farmers to irrigate late in the fall
and early in the spring to improve the water content of the soil is not an efficient water
practice in most areas. See DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSED OPERATING CRITERIA FOR THE LOWER TRUCKEELOWER CARSON RIVER BASINS (1977).
55. Orr Ditch Decree, supra note 47.
56. NEVADA STATE ENGINEER & DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, NEVADA LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS 31 (1955); NEV. REV. STAT. § §533.045, .060(1) (Repl. 1973).
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has determined that other appropriators are entitled to appropriate
and divert waters in excess of quantities to which prior appropriators
are entitled.' 7 Since beneficial use is the basic measure and limit of
the right to the use of water,5 8 a prior appropriator cannot prevent
others from using the surplus above his own economical and reasonable needs.' 9
Waste
The other side of the coin in enforcing effective beneficial use is
the prevention of waste. The Nevada statutes are specific in declaring
the waste of water to be unlawful. 6 0
The report prepared for the Pyramid Lake Task Force by ClydeCriddle-Woodword, Inc., on the diversion of water from the Truckee
River for use in the Newlands Project 6 ' stated that the average spill
of water from the Lahontan Reservoir for the years of record was
39,000 acre feet of water per year. That calculation was based upon
the Bureau of Reclamation's reconstruction of the 1918-1970 flows.
62
The United States Geological Survey Report by Howard Mathai
demonstrated that the average flow of the Truckee River for the total
period of record, 1900-1974, was substantially greater than the
Bureau of Reclamation's calculation. However, there has been no
record made of the diversions from the Truckee River prior to 1967.
Therefore, we do not know how much of the flood flow of the
Truckee River has been taken to Lahontan Reservoir and spilled in
years past. But we do know that during the period 1967-1974, an
average 44,000 acre foot spill (or "precautionary drawdown," in the
language of the Bureau of Reclamation) occurred annually at Lahontan Reservoir.6" Some of the water spilled from that reservoir may
57. Anderson Land & Stock Co. v. McConnell, 188 F. 818 (C.C.D. Nev. 1910); Twaddle
v. Winters, 29 Nev. 88, 85 P. 280 (1906), aff'd on rehearing, 89 P. 289 (1907); Walsh v.
Wallace, 26 Nev. 299, 67 P. 914 (1902).
58. NEV. REV. STAT. §533.035 (Repl. 1973); 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 514.4 (1972), where the limitation to beneficial use is fully explained and annotated.
59. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 F. 9
(9th Cir. 1917); Doherty v. Pratt, 34 Nev. 343, 124 P. 574 (1912); Roeder v. Stein, 23 Nev.
92, 42 P. 867 (1895).
60. NEV. REV. STAT. § §533.460, .530 (Repls. 1977, 1973).
61. Report of Clyde-Criddle-Woodward, Inc., Exhibit Nos. U-583 and U-615, Pyramid
Lake case, supra note 8.
62. A report of the U.S. Geological Survey by H. Mathai, "Long Term Flow of the
Truckee River in California and Nevada," 1974, Menlo Park Regional Office, Menlo Park,
California, shows an average flow of 680,000 acre feet per year whereas previous reports had
used the figure of 479,400 acre feet per year. See also DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSED OPERATING CRITERIA FOR
THE LOWER TRUCKEE-LOWER CARSON RIVER BASINS 11-102 (1977).
63. Id. at 11-96.
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have been beneficial to the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge, but the majority was wasted.
More significant was the report of Claude Dukes, watermaster
under the Orr Ditch Decree, which established that large amounts of
water in excess of the decreed rights have historically been diverted
from the Truckee River and circulated through the ditches in the
Truckee Meadows during the irrigation season. Some of the excess
diversions were the result of urban sprawl encompassing irrigated
lands without a reduction in the amount of water diverted. Mr.
Dukes testified that no attempt was made to control the diversion in
the Truckee Meadows except in times of water shortage and that, to
his knowledge, over 200,000 acre feet per annum was often diverted
to meet a current decreed demand of 67,000 acre feet per year.
Diversion to ditches in that area had been regulated to their decreed
amounts in only three months since the entry of the decree in 1944.
Even though some of that water returns to the Truckee River, a
substantial amount is lost.
The historic practices of diverting an excessive amount of Truckee
River water to Lahontan Reservoir and diverting excess water
through the ditches in the Truckee Meadow were wasteful in the
extreme. Those practices were a violation of Nevada law. 6 1 Because
of that waste, when an attempt is made to preserve instream flows in
the Truckee River it appears reasonable to assert that the issues
concerning the reasonable requirements of effective beneficial use
and the elimination of waste in the Truckee River watershed and in
the Newlands Reclamation Project should not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 6 1 Another action can be
maintained to try those issues and to keep the resulting flows in the
Truckee River by enforcing the Nevada law on waste.
In the Dangberg case, 6 6 the federal court set aside three previous
decrees on the Carson River which had adjudicated various amounts of
water to parties in the suit based on the application of the riparian
doctrine. The court held that the amounts of water so adjudicated
were wasteful and that adoption of the principles of the appropriation doctrine required such waste to be eliminated. In reaching its
decision, the court placed great weight upon the need to conserve
water in arid regions.
64. NEV. REV. STAT. § § 533.045, .060(1) (Repl. 1973) (on diversion limitations);id.
(on beneficial use); id. § §533.460, .530 (Repls. 1977, 1973) (on penalties for
waste).
65. See generally Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897).
66. Id.

§ 533.035
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Rights of Water Users on UnadjudicatedTributaries, Users of
Groundwater,and Users Upstream and Downstream from the
Adjudicated Area
An adjudication proceeding such as a quiet title action is a finite
thing. It must by its nature be limited to a specific area of a given
stream that is placed in issue by the pleadings 6 " and that is within
the jurisdiction of the court. The water rights of persons outside the
adjudicated area or from a source wtihin the area which was not
adjudicated should not be barred.
At the time of the proceedings leading up to the Orr Ditch Decree,
there were a substantial number of water users diverting from the
Truckee River, its tributaries, and from Lake Tahoe (the source of
the Truckee River) who were not parties to the Orr Ditch proceedings. These water users may be divided into two groups:
Group 1. Those water users whose use was located in the state of
Nevada, including the users on the tributaries to the Truckee River
not listed
in the decree and those who lived in Nevada around Lake
68
Tahoe.
Group 2. The water users from the Truckee River, its tributaries,
and the Lake Tahoe area who were located in the state of California.
The court in the Orr Ditch Decree had jurisdiction over both the
water and water users in the first group, 6 9 but those persons and
their rights were not addressed in the litigation. Since a quiet title
suit is local and not transitory, 70 the federal court in the Orr Ditch
proceedings did not have jurisdiction over the water of the Truckee
River tributaries or of Lake Tahoe located in the state of California, 7 1 as long as the California users of that water did not appear
in the Nevada court.
With respect to the first group, the law is clear that the equal right
of the residents of both California and Nevada to divert water from
67. See Lynch v. Kempt, 4 Cal. 2d 440, 49 P.2d 817 (1935), wherein the court held that
the issues in water adjudication cases are limited to those things placed in issue by plaintiff's
complaint and counter-claims of the defendant, if any.
68. The Truckee River flows out of the top six feet of Lake Tahoe. Any use of water out
of that lake or any use of water from any of the tributaries will have a direct effect upon the
amount of water available in the Truckee River for use by the parties to the Orr Ditch
Decree. This effect will be particularly important during periods of drought. A review of the
Orr Ditch Decree reveals that none of the water users on the tributaries not listed or around
Lake Tahoe were included as parties.
69. See Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co., 245 F. 30,
35 (9th Cir. 1917); Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 152 F. 11 (9th Cir. 1907),
aff'd, 218 U.S. 258 (1910); Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14, 15, 20-21 (N.D. Calif. 1905).
70. Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 F. 9,
25-29 (9th Cir. 1917).
71. Id.
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an interstate stream such as the Truckee River must be recognized.
But persons on one side of the boundary line have no right to divert
waters of the stream to the injury of those on the other side of the
boundary. 2 Where a person or his predecessor was not a party to an
earlier adjudication and his water rights were not part of the adjudicatory process, then any action that would delegate that person's water
right to an inferior position with respect to other water users on the
stream would deprive him of a property right without due process of
law. 7 3 With respect to the second group, the courts in the state of
Nevada had no jurisdiction. Therefore, the Orr Ditch Decree is not a
bar to the adjudication of either the priority or the measure of the
water rights of either the first or the second group. Any attempt to
subject those rights to that bar would deprive those water users of
their property rights without due process of law.
Changes in Place and Nature of Use
The bar against further proceedings in decrees issued through
water adjudication suits does not preclude redetermination of the
amount of water which a transferee can remove from the stream
when the water is separated from the land and the nature of the use
is changed. In those circumstances, the right received by the transferee is limited to the actual historical use in the hands of the transferor. The provisions of the decree setting the amount of the water
the transferor could have used are not protected by res judicata or
collateral estoppel in a proceeding between the transferee and third
parties having an interest in the water.
In the case of City of Westminster v. Church,7 4 the City of Westminster acquired certain water rights which had been subjected to
agricultural use. The amount of the water rights had been established
in various decrees, including a 1958 decree in which both present
parties had participated. When sued, the city contended that the
1958 decree was a complete bar to the suit.
The court disagreed. It held that res judicata constituted an absolute bar only when there is in both the prior and subsequent suits
identity of subject matter, identity of cause of action, identity of
parties to the action, and identity of capacity of the persons for
which or against whom the claim is made. The court explained that
the subject matter of that action was clearly a different cause of
action that had not been presented in the prior proceeding. Then the
court said:
72. Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14 (N.D. Calif. 1905).
73. State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935).
74. 167 Colo. 1,445 P.2d 52 (1968).
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Where an owner of decreed rights, after obtaining a decree permitting a change in point of diversion, enlarges or attempts to enlarge
the use of his water rights to the injury of other75appropriators, the

permissive decree does not bar relief to the latter.
The court stated that the municipality had the legal right to devote
its acquired water rights to municipal uses, provided that no injury
accrues to the vested rights of other appropriators. 7 6
The court recognized that the principal danger attending the
municipality's altered use was that the city would attempt to use a
continuous flow where the city's grantor only used the water for
intermittent irrigation, and that such action by the municipality
would enlarge its use of the water to the full extent of the decreed
right, regardless of historical usage. To protect against the possibility
of such extended use of the water rights, courts should impose conditions on the change of use and the point of diversion sufficient to
protect the rights of others. The court noted that it had upheld such
restrictive positions in numerous cases. 7
In the Pyramid Lake case, the Sierra Pacific Power Company
held a substantial number of water rights transferred to it by persons who had used the water for agricultural purposes in the vicinity
of the expanding city. These were acquired as the city population
expanded into agricultural land. Sierra Pacific claimed the full
amount of water decreed to the prior owner. 7 8 The cases cited above
have limited the amount of water that could be transferred to the
historical consumptive use that occurred while the water was being
used by the transferor. Those cases held that junior appropriators
had a right to the return flows. Therefore, one of the issues that
could reduce the diversions from streams and is not subject to the
bar against further litigation is the question of the amount of historical consumptive use by the transferors of a water right when
there are return flows to the ground water basin or to surface
streams. These other rights may not be jeopardized or diminished by
the transfer. 9 In cases where the diversion by the transferee is
limited to the consumptive use of the transferor, the difference between the diversions by the transferor and the transferee Will result
in less diversion from the stream. 8 0 This increase in stream flows has
75. Id. at

-,

445 P.2d at 55.

76. Id. at -, 445 P.2d at 58.
77. Id.
78. Testimony of Mr. Leighton, Engineer for Sierra Pacific Power Co., Pyramid Lake
case, supra note 8.
79. 1 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE 19 WESTERN STATES 631 (1971).
80. Whether or not the transferee is entitled to credit for his return flows from the new
use, usually at a different place and amount, is a subject of unresolved controversy in most
states.
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some interesting possibilities where a claim for instream flows can be
enforced.
Matters Not Intended To Be Covered by Injunctive Language in the
General Provisions of a Decree
The Orr Ditch Decree adjudicated the rights to divert water from
the Truckee River for certain specific uses. In order to understand
what was decided and what water uses, if any, were barred by the
injunctive provision of the decree, it is necessary to consider the
decree as a whole. The injunctive provisions of that decree read as
follows:
The parties, persons, corporations, intervenors, grantees, successors
in interest and substituted parties hereinbefore names, and their and
each of their servants, agents, attorneys, assigns and all persons
claiming by, through or under them and their successors, in or to the
water rights or lands herein mentioned or described, are and each of
them is hereby forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or
claiming any rights in or to the waters of the Truckee River or its
tributaries, or the waters of any of the creeks or streams or other
waters hereinbefore mentioned except the rights, specified, determined and allowed by this decree, and each and all of said parties,
persons, corporations, intervenors, agents, attorneys, servants, assigns and successors in interest; and all persons claiming by, through

or under them, are hereby perpetually restrained and enjoined from
diverting, taking or interfering in any way with the waters of the
Truckee River or its tributaries or with water of any of the creeks or
streams, or with any of the other waters hereinbefore mentioned, so
as to in any manner prevent or interfere with the diversion, use and
enjoyment of the waters of any of the other persons or parties as
allowed or adjudicated by this decree, having due regard to the
relative priorities herein set forth; and each of the said parties and
persons and each of their agents, servants, attorneys and employees is
hereby enjoined and restrained from ever taking, diverting, using or
claiming any of the water so decreed, in any manner, or at any time
so as to in any way interfere with the prior rights of any other

persons or parties having prior rights under this decree, as herein set
forth, until such persons or parties having prior rights have received
for their several uses the waters hereby allowed and adjudged to
them.8 1

When considering the effect of this type of injunctive provision
barring further proceedings on the right to the use of water, the
courts have held that it is necessary to consider the decree as a
81. Orr Ditch Decree, supra note 47.
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whole .8s 2 To achieve a consistent interpretation, the facts and circumstances surrounding the litigation of the issues of the decree may
be supported by extrinsic evidence.8 I Where possible, the decree is
to be interpreted in that manner which will make all of its provisions
consistent.8 4
Careful consideration of the Orr Ditch Decree demonstrates how
the decree was intended to be a bar to further litigation only as to
those things which were actually decided therein and not as to those
things which might have been litigated. The salient points are as
follows:
(1) The final provision of the decree reads as follows:
The foregoing adjudications set forth in Claims Numbers 1 to 744,
inclusive, of this Decree are based upon conditions existing at or
prior to the entry of said Temporary Restraining Order herein on
February 13, 1926: and such adjudication shall not be deemed to
limit, reestablish, or otherwise affect any rights acquired, created or
lost subsequently thereto by conveyance, transfer, abandonment,
non-user, contract (including said Truckee River Agreement) or
otherwise, but the rights of the United States shall be as herein

adjudicated as of the date of this decree save only as the same may
be affected by said Truckee River Agreement. 8s

The proviso makes it clear that the rights to divert water determined
in that decree in 1944 are based upon the conditions existing at or
before February 13, 1926, and no right to the diversion of water
from the Truckee River acquired, created, or lost thereafter was
either established or affected in any manner. This proviso specifically
includes the Truckee River Agreement.8 6 Thus, it is clear that such
82. Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 109 P. 748 (1910).
83. Hinderlider v. Canon Heights Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 117 Colo. 183, -, 185
P.2d 325, 327 (1926); Bijou Irrigation Dist. v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co., 67 Colo. 336,
-,

184 P. 382, 385 (1919).

84. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 73, at 363 (1969) states:
[I]n construing a judgment, it should be examined and considered in its
entirety. Such construction should be given to a judgment as will give force
and effect to every word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole consistent
and reasonable. In applying this rule, effect must be given to that which is
unavoidably and necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as to that which is
expressed in the most appropriate language.
85. Orr Ditch Decree, supra note 47.
86. Why the right of the United States to divert its water under Claims No. 1, 2 and 3 is
established on a different date from other water users is peculiar. Nevertheless, it is clear
that no rights with respect to the Truckee River Agreement were adjudicated in the decree.
If the court had done so, the decree would have been inconsistent. The diversion rights of
the various parties set in Section VII of that agreement are substantially different from the
diversion rights in the decree. Inconsistent decrees are subject to further litigation or reversal
or modification. Pacific Livestock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 52 Nev. 279, 296, 286 P.
120 (1930); 3 KINNEY ON IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1577, at 2811 (2d ed.
1912).
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claims, including those based on the Truckee River Agreement, are
not established or barred by the decree, but are simply undeter8
mined. 7
(2) The court recognized that there were other users of water
from the stream than those persons who were parties to this proceeding, and it sought to protect the rights of such parties by the inclusion of the following provision: "When any other user will thereby
be deprived of any part of the water to which he is entitled, no ditch
owner or user shall be allowed to divert away from the stream extra
water for regulating the flow in any ditch." 8 S If the court had been
limiting its protection to those water users who were parties to the
decree, it would have identified them with the language that it used
in the preceding and the following paragraphs, such as "the person or
party entitled to use under this decree." This provision is consistent
with the requirements of the Nevada statutes 8 9 that restrict the
diversion of water from streams to the reasonable economic requirements of beneficial use.
(3) Part of the decree reads: "In any case where water is obtained
from two or more sources, the aggregate amount of the combined
waters from such sources which may be used, shall not exceed the
amount required for such use as herein determined." 9 0 By this proviso, besides preventing waste, the court recognized that it had not
adjudicated the rights to use water as those rights are affected by the
other sources of water such as:
" The groundwater as it affects the flows of the Truckee River.
" The relative rights to the flows of the Truckee River as it is
commingled with the flows of the Carson River in Lahontan
Reservoir to irrigate the lands of the Carson Division.
" The rights on unadjudicated tributaries of the Truckee River.
(4) The most significant provision concerning what the decree did
and did not decide is contained in the following paragraph:
Whenever in this decree words of ownership are used in connection
with any irrigated lands, such words shall not adjudicate, determine
or affect any property rights therein, and this decree does not and
shall not in any way determine the title to or rights in any property
whatsoever, other than the rights to the diversion and use of water as
herein determined and established. In the cases where, by this de87. When the defendants claim that all the waters of the Truckee River have been
adjudicated, they are really relying upon the provisions of the Truckee River Agreement and
not the Orr Ditch Decree.
88. Orr Ditch Decree, supra note 47.
89. NEV. REV. STAT. § §533.045, .060(1) (Repl,. 1973)..
90. Orr Ditch Decree, supra note 47.
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cree, water is allowed to be diverted through any ditch by the owner
thereof for another party the conditions of any contractual relations
existing between them are not hereby determined. 9 1
The Nevada Supreme Court makes it clear that a water right under
Nevada law is in the nature of realty. 9 2 Further, the instream use of
water for the purpose of preserving Pyramid Lake, which is the major
natural resource of Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, is every bit as
much a property right under federal law as an appropriative water
right is under state law. Indian water rights have also been held to
partake of the nature of realty. 9 1 It could be argued that the court
may not have had this latter definition of property in mind when it
used the language of the decree, but it must be presumed to know
the effect of Nevada water law.
The qualification in the above paragraphs is in addition to the first
statement in that paragraph, so it does not refer to the title to real
estate as such, but refers to all property rights including water rights.
The court was specifically limiting the effect of its decree to the
diversion rights therein determined and established. In other words,
it was not barring anything that might have been decided but had not
been determined.
The injunctive provisions cited above which restrict the assertion
of any rights in or to the waters of the Truckee River by the parties
to that proceeding must be construed in light of the foregoing provisions in order that the total decree will be consistent. If in interpreting the decree res judicata or collateral estoppel is applied against
those things that might have been determined, then the above-cited
provisions of the decree are inconsistent with the injunctive provision. Further, if the decree is a bar to all further proceedings to
determine the use of water from the Truckee River, then the undetermined conditional provisions of the decree-the relationship of
water users on the other sources of water that contribute to the
waters of the Truckee River, the rights to the use of water before and
after the irrigation season, and the instream right to the use of the
waters of the Truckee River-could never be addressed because they
might have been determined in the original proceeding. That is inconsistent with prevailing law, and such a construction of the decree
91. Id.
92. Nenzel v. Rochester Silver Corp., 50 Nev. 352, 259 P. 632 (1927); see also AdamsMcGill Co. v. Hendrix, 22 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D. Nev. 1938); Application of Filippini, 66
Nev. 17, 202 P.2d 535 (1949); Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 1, 171
P. 166 (1918).
93. S. Rifkind, Report of the Special Master 265 (1960) (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963)).
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should be rejected. On the other hand, if the decree is interpreted so
that the bar to further action is applied only to those facts and issues
actually decided therein and not to matters that might have been
decided, then all the provisions of the decree are consistent.
V. THE ISSUE OF INSTREAM FLOWS

The Orr Ditch Decree, just as most decrees under the appropriation doctrine, adjudicated only the right to divert water from the
Truckee River. Inquiry reveals that the appropriation doctrine as
developed in the West did not recognize the instream use of water as
a right that could be protected. 9 4
At the time of the Orr Ditch proceedings, the diversion of water
for beneficial use was required to establish a water right under the
law of a state which used the appropriation doctrine. In the case of
Colorado Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power
Company,9" the water conservation district claimed that, pursuant
to a Colorado statute, water need not be diverted from the natural
stream but could be kept in the stream to the extent necessary for
the preservation and propagation of fish. It was argued that since the
propagation and preservation of fish had occurred for more than 40
years, and since the public had used the area to fish and for recreational activities connected therewith during all this period of time,
appropriation had been accomplished by the members of the public
and certain state and federal officials. The power company protested
the claim and moved to dismiss. The court did so, and the Colorado
Supreme Court in affirming stated:
94. The principal ideas in the discussion immediately following were drawn from R.
DEWSNUP, LEGAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM WATER VALUES (1971) (Legal
Study 8-A for the National Water Commission), wherein Mr. Dewsnup states:
The law of appropriation was designed to encourage people to withdraw water
from the stream and apply it to beneficial uses to promote economic development. This is to be contrasted with the riparian rights system of the East,
which was concerned with protecting landowners who held property and quality of the flow-and this automatically resulted in a substantial measure of
protection to the natural watercourse, its scenic attractions, and the aquatic
life in it.
But the appropriation regime was a rejection of riparian concepts-a rejection
of protection of instream uses. Since water rights were perfected only if water
was diverted from and taken out of the stream, even if it was caused to go dry.
As a result, it is not surprising that little or no protection was given to natural
stream values in the early cases. On the other hand, in view of present day
pressures to preserve recreational and environmental values, it is not surprising
that marked changes have been brought about in appropriation doctrines-so
that some measure of protection of natural stream values is now afforded in
most of the states.
95. 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
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Numerous opinions of this court have defined the essential requirements of an "appropriation" of water....
There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition that a
minimum flow of water may be "appropriated" in a natural stream
for piscatorial purposes without diversion of any portion ... of the
stream. By the enactment of [the statute in question] the legislature
did not intend to bring about such an extreme departure from well
established doctrine, and we hold that no such departure was
brought about by said statute. 9 6
A similar case arose in Montana. The state had enacted a statute
intended to protect its highly prized trout fishery waters. In a case
involving that statute, the issue was whether the public could acquire
a prior right to the stream such as a fishery resource by using it for
that purpose, thus preventing subsequent appropriations which
would damage the fishery. The court held that such public rights
could not be established. The following language expressed the

court's views:
The Commission does maintain that the public has a prior right in
the waters of the creek which would require DePuy to release some
water through a fishladder. The public right urged by the Commission
would be based on the fact that the public had used the creek as a
fishing stream and natural fish hatchery before DePuy built his
dam....
Such a public right has never been declared in the case law of this
state. 97
The same requirement of diversion exists under Utah law9 8 and in
the state of Nevada. 9 9 The only exception applies to stock water00
ing.'
While the right to instream uses of water was not recognized or
adjudicated in quiet title proceedings in the Orr Ditch Decree or
under most court proceedings which have applied the appropriation
doctrine, instream water rights have been recognized under federal
96. Id. at -, 406 P.2d at 799, 800.
97. Paradise Rainbows v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 148 Mont. 412,

-,

421 P.2d 717,

721 (1966).

98. See UTAH STATE ENGINEER & DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, UTAH LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS 48-50 (1965).

99. Application of Fillippini, 66 Nev. 17,

, 202 P.2d 535, 537 (1949); see also

Rodgers v. Pitt, 129 F. 932, 930-40 (C.C.D. Nev. 1904); Miller & Lux v. Rickey, 127 F. 573
(C.C.D. Nev. 1904); In re Bassett Creek, 62 Nev. 461, 155 P.2d 324 (1945); Doherty v.
Pratt, 34 Nev. 343, 124 P. 574 (1912); Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev. 299, 67 P. 914 (1902).
100. See Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Guley, 53 Nev. 163, 295 P. 772 (1931).
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law in both navigable and non-navigable streams.1 0 1 Reserved water
rights under federal law arise when the federal sovereign withdraws
land from the public domain and reserves it for purposes which
require the use of water. In Cappaert v. United States,' 0 2 the Supreme Court stated:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant
water ... to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in
unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and
is superior to the rights of future appropriators. . . . The doctrine
applies to Indian Reservations and other federal enclaves, encqmpassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. 1 03
One of the primary authorities cited by the Court was Federal
Power Commission v. Oregon,' 04 also known as the Pelton Dam
case. That case is an example of the withdrawal of the lands and the
federal reservation of instream water uses.' 0 1 There public lands and
the lands of an Indian reservation were withdrawn as an instream
power site for a high-rise dam. The Supreme Court held that the
water rights for the power project and plans for the preservation or
replacement of the runs of anadromous fish utilizing the nonnavigable stream were the subject of federal jurisdiction and would
be determined pursuant to federal law. State laws on the subject
were held inapplicable.' 0 6
In the recent case of United States v. New Mexico,' 0 7 however,
Justice Rehnquist spoke for a divided Court in holding that instream
flows for environmental, recreational, or wildlife preservation uses
101. Those cases discussing the power of the federal sovereign over navigation and associated interests on navigable streams are too well known to require citation here. However,
whether the stream is navigable or non-navigable is irrelevant insofar as the creation of a
reserved water right for the benefit of a reservation of the United States is concerned. See
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976).
102. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
103. Id. at 138.

104. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
105. Other examples, such as United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899), are pertinent, but the best example is the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16
U.S.C. § § 1271-1287 (1976). This act preserves the free-flowing characteristics of the
waters of the wild scenic or recreational rivers which are added to the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers Systems. A current case in New Mexico, State v. Moly Corp. Inc., Civil No.
9780 (D.N.M., filed Nov. 2, 1972), is addressing the flows of the Red River. That river was
specifically designated as a wild and scenic river in the original act.

106. 349 U.S. 435, 443-45, 447-50 (1955).
107. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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were not required to fulfill the primary purpose of the federal sovereign in the creation of the Mimbres National Forest in southern New
Mexico.' 0 8 The dissent in the 5-4 decision made a cogent argument
that a forest includes flora and fauna and that water should be reserved for their needs as well as for the growing of trees and the
prevention of erosion of the watershed.' 0 I But the majority, adopting a narrow view of the primary purpose of Congress in creating
national forests, held that instream flows for recreation, fish and
wildlife, and environmental uses were necessary only to fulfill the
secondary purposes of Congress, and that the United States would be
required to comply with the provisions of state law to obtain water
rights for the fulfillment of such secondary purposes.' 1 0 Just how
that could be accomplished when New Mexico law does not recognize instream flows as a beneficial use of water' 1 1 was not discussed.
The implication, in view of the references to California v. United
States, ' I2 appears to be that instream flows will be recognized as a
water right only if state law recognizes it, unless the primary purpose
of the federal sovereign requires instream use of the water or unless
there is specific congressional legislation on the subject.' 'I
The Supreme Court in the Cappaert case found that waters may be
reserved by the United States for the purpose of preserving a fishery.' 1 ' It held further that, "Federal water rights are not dependent
upon state law or state procedures."' I I How this concept is going to
be made consistent with the holding of the court in United States v.
New Mexico and California v. United States is not clear.
In one case concerning Pyramid Lake, the question of whether an
instream water right was reserved by the United States for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake and its fishery when the Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation was created was held to be a matter of federal and not
state law.' 16 Therefore, application to the precepts of the bar
108. Id.
109. Id. at 719-24 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 715. The issue of instream flows for environmental needs was included along
with the discussion of water for the needs of fish and wildlife, cattle grazing, etc. as a
secondary use subject to state law!
111. While the State Game Commission has general authority for the protection and
propagation of fish and game resources in New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 17-1-14 (1978))
and recreation and fishing are beneficial uses of water under the New Mexico Constitution,
art. 16, a diversion from the stream is required to establish a protected right to such use of
water. See State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1945).
112. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
113. Id.
114. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
115. Id. at 145.
116. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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against further litigation developed in state law to determine rights to
divert water from streams may not be justified where instream flows
are established by federal law. The ultimate resolution of that issue is
unclear. Even if this distinction exists, however, it does not provide
any help when the proceedings involve state law exclusively.
Some of the problems posed by the states' refusal to recognize
instream flows as a beneficial use pursuant to the appropriation doctrine may be solved by the growing trend among the states to provide
some degree of environmental protection along watercourses by reversing old rules and recognizing instream flows by legislative action.' I 7 If recognition of instream flows is to be effective, however,
a way must be found to deal with the bar against further litigation
that will be asserted as a defense to these claims. The prior discussion
in this article shows the basis for arguing that the bar should not
apply to litigation over instream flows.
VI. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF RES JUDICATA TO INSTREAM FLOWS
As stated earlier, the way to determine whether the bar to further
litigation applies requires an examination of the specific issue and
evidence presented to the court in the prior proceedings, for the
purpose of comparison to the evidence necessary to prove the new
claim. The facts required to prove the needs of spawning fish or the
requirements of the flora and fauna in a given stretch of stream are
so clearly different from the facts required to prove a right to divert
water for agriculture, power purposes, or municipal and industrial
uses that instream use must constitute a different claim or cause of
action. Therefore, such a claim will not be subject to the bar against
further adjudication on a stream system unless it was specifically
addressed in the first proceeding.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § §37-82-103 to 105 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § §73-3-8
to 29 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE §90.22.010 (Supp. 1979). The legislation cited
above is an example of the ways in which the various states are attempting to find ways of
matching the need to preserve minimum stream flows and protect the environment or
ecology of streams within the concepts of the appropriation doctrine. For further discussion
of this matter, see R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, STRATEGY FOR PRESERVING INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL WATER COMM'N (W.E.L.U.T.
Project 22, prepared for the United States Fish & Wildlife Service Cooperative Instream
Flow Service Group at Colorado State University). That report discusses in detail various
possible strategies for preserving instream flows for fish and wildlife uses.
Idaho has recognized an instream use for recreation and scenic purposes as an appropriation, and pursuant to the terms of specific statutes has set aside specified areas as health
resorts and recreation areas. No diversion is required. IDAHO CODE § §67-4301 to 4312
(Supp. 1979). In State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Administration, 96 Idaho
440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974), a divided court held that there was no constitutional requirement to divert the water from its natural channel and that recreational and scenic instream
values were a beneficial use.
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Further, it is easy to see from the previous discussion that many of
the exceptions to the bar against further action that were developed
in water rights cases can apply to litigation over instream flows. The
most important thing to remember about instream flows when a
right to such a use is claimed is that in most cases, except for some
seepage, evapro-transpiration along the stream edges, and evaporation, instream flows are not consumptive uses. After being used to
preserve the habitat for a fishery in a given stretch of stream, the
same water is available for diversion and use downstream with very
little diminution. Many instream flow needs, such as the maintenance
of a fishery that needs water for spring-spawning fish, can exercise
that right when irrigation demands are at their lowest. In many cases,
efficient management of stream systems which results in limiting
diversions to the effective beneficial use'1 8 will result in a significant
increase in the amount of water in parts of some streams. This water
should be available for other uses, including instream flows. However, without some action by the states to protect the instream
flows, the water saved by limiting present diversions from the
streams will be appropriated and diverted by others.
VII. CONCLUSION
Water adjudication suits are a unique type of legal proceeding, in
part because of the unique nature of water and the method of administering its use. This uniqueness makes the bar to further proceedings
inapplicable in some cases. Quiet title actions in water cases are also
subject to certain limitations which restrict the applicability of that
bar. Among those issues that are not subject to the bar against further action is instream flows for the preservation of the ecology of a
stream bed and its fishery.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not constitute a bar to the
establishment of instream flows because that issue requires proof of
different facts and those facts constitute a separate cause of action
118. In the author's opinion "beneficial use" as used in western water law has been a
method of defining the acceptable uses of water. Very seldom have the courts addressed the
effective use of water except in the context of the "duty of water"-i.e., the amount of
water required to sustain successful agriculture on the land in question.
The recent trend in water decrees to establish the amount of consumptive use of each
water user as well as the amount of diversion right, see, e.g., the decree in Arizona v.

California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), modified, 383 U.S. 268 (1966), and the most recent modification of that decree on January 9, 1979, -U.S.
-, 99 S.Ct. 995 (1979), may
change the system. If the principles involved in limiting a water right to its consumptive use,
with a determination of the return flow which is available for use by others, were applied to
existing decrees, the elimination of waste caused by inefficient practices could make significant amounts of water available for other uses.
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from the facts used to prove a right to divert water from the stream
for agricultural or similar purposes. One major premise of this article
is that there is water available for use as instream flows if wasteful
diversions are eliminated, methods of making effective beneficial use
of water are adopted, and flows of stream systems are carefully
managed for multiple uses, not just for the benefit of those who
divert. The experience that convinced this author of that possibility
is the Truckee River and the Pyramid Lake litigation.
The stream management studies on the Truckee River demonstrated that there was sufficient water in the stream in most years to
provide instream flows sufficient to meet the requirements of the
fishery and other existing uses. An extended drought could require
close management of the streams and all storage reservoirs and an
adjustment of some water uses. But with the operation of fish hatcheries to assist the law of natural reproduction, a viable natural fishery
using instream flows could be achieved if the instream flow was
protected.
The author believes that the situation on the Truckee River is not
unique. Serious inspection will reveal many places where enforcement of effective beneficial use will significantly reduce diversions
from stream systems of the West. In addition, as more effective
methods of irrigation such as sprinklers and drip irrigation are used
on a large scale, the opportunity for improvement of instream flows
increases.
Tighter administration of stream systems, construction of some
storage dams, and the implementation of water savings techniques is
the inevitable future of the West. Those who seek to preserve the
fisheries of the West and the environment of some of its stream
systems can obtain the benefit of some of the water that will be saved
if they take early action. This objective can be achieved if the fish
and wildlife interests of each state seek legislation similar to that in
Nevada which restricts diversions to effective beneficial use and
makes it unlawful to divert water in excess of that amount. Then
comes the hard task: the state legislatures must be pursuaded to
recognize the need for instream flows by implementing legislation.
That legislation can be the recognition of instream flows as a beneficial use which can be protected under the law of appropriation, as
occurred in Idaho, or the designation of various areas of streams
where minimum flows are to be obtained and preserved, as occurred
in Washington.
With either of those legislative acts in force, the litigation that will
be filed by public or private parties can be used as a forum to enforce
the rule of effective beneficial use of water, and instream flows can
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be increased. At times the federal or state governments may need to
initiate action to reduce waste and protect instream flows against the
claims of diverters. In this way, the opportunity to reduce diversions
from streams and, with timely action, to obtain the right to instream
flows can be generated in some areas.
It is recognized that the course of action recommended in this
article is involved, even complex, and will require an extensive period
of time to implement. But it is the author's belief that litigation and
legislation requiring conservation of water are the wave of the future,
and instream flows have a legitimate place in that wave.' 1 9 If the
western states really intend to have state law be the basis for the
administration of water rights in streams of the West, as United
States v. New Mexico and California v. United States seem to offer,
they will need to demonstrate their ability to resolve the issues of
waste, ineffective use, and the preservation of instream flows.

119. Since this article was written, three cases involving instream flows or the right to use
water in place for fish and wildlife purposes on Indian lands have been decided. Each is
listed below with a short discussion. These cases do not change the reasoning nor the thrust
of this article, but two of them do add weight to the effort to preserve the values inherent in
preserving the use of some water in place in streams and wildlife areas. They are:
(1) United States & Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July
23, 1979). The court sustained the claim of the Spokane Indian Tribe to a reserved water
right, with an immemorial priority, to sufficient water to maintain minimum instream flows
in a creek partially within their reservation. That water right included water to preserve the
ecology in a portion of that creek for fish and wildlife.
(2) Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978). The
court denied the tribes' claim of instream flow rights in No Name Creek, a stream entirely
within the Colville Indian Reservation. It held that the evidence failed to prove the existence
of a fishery in that stream that was within the purposes for which the Colville Reservation
was established. In fact it held that the evidence established that a fishery requiring significant instream flows had never existed in the stream until artificially started there by the
tribes at a much later date. (The cutthroat trout fishery had been established after the
inception of the lawsuit.)
(3) United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979). The court upheld the claim
of the tribe to an immemorial water right, in place, to preserve the fish and wildlife values in
the streams and marshes of the upper Klamath River in Oregon. Those areas were traditionally used as hunting and fishing grounds of the tribe. An earlier related case, Kimball v.
Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3766 (May 22,
1979), had determined that the members of this tribe held a continuing interest in that
wildlife area, even though their reservation had been terminated.

